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MEDIA CHOICE AND BRAND QUALITY
Mark Paul Gius

I TRODUCTION
Most previous studies of advertising have been concerned with the effects or the
determinants of firm or industry-level advertising expenditures. While useful for understanding
competition in differentiated-product industries, this earlier research has neglected two imponant
issues.
First. most previous studies have assumed that advertising is a homogeneous commodity that
firms purchase in order to inform consumers and to potentially increase sales. This view of
advertising does not take into account the possible effects that the quality of the advertising
message and the choice of medium over which this message is transmitted may have on the desired
outcome.
Second, the goal of most advertising is to increase brand sales. Unfortunately, most previous
studies of advertising have used only firm or industry-level data. A study of firm-level
advertising, however, cannot determine if advertising has an effect on brand level sales. Hence,
the appropriate level at which to study advertising in differentiated-product industries is at the
brand level.
This paper addresses some of these issues and attempts to explain the media choice decision
at the brand level. Why do cenain brands spend a large share of their advertising budgets on
television, while other brands do most of their advertising in magazines? For example, in 1990,
the Seagram Company spent almost $300,000 to advertise Kessler whiskey; all advertising for
Kessler in that year was on billboards. In the same year, however, the Seagram Company spent
$2.89 million to advertise Seagram Seven Crown whiskey, with $2.726 million of that total being
spent on magazine advertising. Why would a company selling two different brands of the same
good allocate the advertising budgets of each brand so differently?'
Previous work in this area is limited (Nelson, 1974; Bresnahan, 1986; Reekie, 1986). In
the present study, an adaptation of the empirical technique of Bresnahan ( 1986) is employed in
order to determine the factors that affect media choice at the brand level. The industry chosen for
study is the liquor industry.
Results of the present study indicate that one of the most imponant determinants of
adverusing media demand is the level of quality of the brand. High-quality liquor brands are more
likely to advertise in magazines than low-quality brands, and low-quality brands are more likely
to advertise on billboards (outdoor) than high-quality brands. This result suggests that brands use
certain media t0 signal their quality levels and thus corroborates the advertising signaling
hypothesis proposed by Nelson ( 1974). Eco nomic fact0rs had little or no effect on the demand
for media services.
In the next section, the empincal technique and theoreucal basis of the present study is
presented. Data sources and results are then discussed. Concluding remarks are presented in the
last section.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND EMPIRICAL MODEL
Several studies have examined the demand for advertising by media type; three of the more
relevant works are summarized here. Nelson ( 1974) studied the role of advertising as information
and proposed that advertisements for search goods are more likely to appear in magazines and
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newspapers, while advertisements for experience goods are more likely to appear on television and
radio. According to Nelson, the reason for this difference in media utilization is because most
search-good advenising is informative m nature; firms place informative advenisements in
magazines and newspapers so consumers have an opportunity to study the advenisements and
learn about the products. Most experience-good advertisements, however, are persuasive in
nature; firms place persuasive advenisements on television and radio where extravagant and novel
productions can be used to persuade consumers to purchase the firm's products. Nelson examined
this issue at the industry level.
Reekie (1986) hypothesized that goods with high income elas11c1t1cs advertise in print media,
while goods with low income elasuciues advertise on television and radio because goods with
high income elasticities are considered to be "imponant" or "superior" goods. Since these goods
are "imponant," consumers are w1lhng to ~pend a substantial amount of ume learning about lhese
products; hence, these types of goods advert1se pnmanly m pnnt media. Goods with low income
elasticities, however, are not considered to be "important." Consumers are not willing to spend
much time learning about these goods; these products advertise pnman ly on television and radio.
Finally, Bresnahan ( 1986) took a somewhat different approach m his study and attempted
to explain !he rise of nanonally branded products and scale economies m advert1smg. Briefly, !he
primary objective of Bresnahan 1s to show that national brands arose becau e of a change in
relauve advertising costs that resulted in labor-intensive stores being replaced by low-service
convenience stores. According to Bresnahan, advert1smg and low-service convenience stores are
complements, while advertising and labor-intensive stores arc substitutes (Bresnahan, 1986). Due
to a relative increase m labor costs, retailers shifted away from labor-intensive stores and replaced
them with low-service convenience stores (Bresnahan. 1986) Hence, advertising became more
important for retailers.
Concerning the rise of national brands, 1f there are economies of scale in advenising, !hen
one would expect that as convenience stores grew in abundance, their shelves would more likely
be stocked with national brands than with small, local brands (Bresnahan, 1986). Using Poner
(1976) as a guide, Bresnahan tested this hypothesis by esumating the demand for advenismg by
media type.
While all of the above studies examine the demand for advert1smg by media type, only
Bresnahan examines it at the brand level. Smee Bresnahan 1s one of the few studies in which an
empirical model of media demand 1s used, a closer exammat1on of this study 1s warranted. The
model employed in Bresnahan is as follows:
If
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where s..., is the share of medium m of the total advert1sing budget of mdustry or firm/; P., is
price of medium m; R.,is the reach or audience size of med mm m ; P, 1s the price of retail services;
F,represents industry or firm-specific variable; m - I, 2, ... , M media; and / - I , 2, ... , N firms or
industries. This model is also used m the present study to examine media choice at the brand level
in the liquor industry.
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One explanatory variable "1.11 Bresnahan did not include, but which is used in the present
study, is brand quality. Quality is included in the present study due to the work of Nelson (1974).
Nelson proposed that wasteful or excessive advertising may act as a signal of quality. According
to Nelson, high-quality products look to repeat purchases. Due to these repeat purchases, highquality products reap significant returns from the formation of goodwill; hence, these products
have an incentive to advertise heavily. Low-quality products, however, cannot reap substantial
returns from advertising because there will be few repeat purchases; low-quality products do not
have an incentive to advertise excessively. Hence, high-quality products will excessively advertise
in order to distinguish themselves from low-quality brands; this signaling should be very prevalent
in experience-good industries where brand quality cannot be determined prior to purchase.2
One issue that Nelson did not address in this signaling hypothesis is that of media utilization.
In other words, if a brand wants to signal its quality by excessively advertising, how best should
it allocate its advertising resources? It is reasonable to assume that a firm wanting to excessively
advertise would use the most expensive advertising media it can find. One way in which to test
this hypothesis is to determine if brand quality has a statistically significant effect on media
demand at the brand level. According to this theory, only high-quality brands would have an
incentive to advertise in the most expensive media. This hypothesis is tested in the present study
for the liquor industry.
The liquor industry was selected for several reasons. First, brand level data is readily
available for this industry. Second. liquors can be designated as being either high quality or low
quality.) These quality classifications are industry standards and are frequently published in trade
journals such as Impact. Finally, distilleries only advertise in three media: magazines, newspapers
(Sunday newspaper supplements), and billboards (outdoor).4 The prices of these various media
are presented in Table I.
TABLEl
COST PER THOUSA D (CPM) OF VARIOUS MEDIA
1990
Media
Network Daytime Television
Network Nighttime Television
Magazine
Daily ewspaper
Sunday Newspaper
Outdoor
Note:

CPM
$

2.46
9.74
19.62
30.61
28.59
1.27

CPM is the cost for reaching one thousand consumers. It
is an industry-accepted measure of advertising media
costs.

Using Bresnahan's empirical model and elson's signaling hypothesis as guides, the
following empirical model is estimated in the present study:
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lnAS, = a. 1 +a. 21nPM +a.JlnPN+a. 4 lnPO a.slnRM
+a.6 1nRN+a.1 lnRO +a. 8 1nQ, +a.,/JR, •et. 1J'RE, u
where AS, denoteS a medium's share of total advemsmg 1mpress1ons or messages for brand i; PM
denotes the price of magazine advemsmg; PN denotes the price of newspaper advertising; PO
denotes the price of outdoor advemsmg. RM denotes the audience size or reach of magazine
advenising; RN denotes the reach of newspaper adverusmg. RO denotes the reach of outdoor
advertising; Q, represents quan111y sold for brand 1; BR-I 11 brand 1 1s a brown liquor and o
otherwise; PRE-I if brand i 1s a high-quality brand and Ootherwise; and 11, represents a nonnally
distributed error term. This equation 1s esumated for each medium used in the liquor industry
using a panel data set of 15 brands for the years 1975 to 1985. a random effects model is
employed.5

DATA
In order to esumate the model presented m the previous secuon. data on pnces of advertising
media, audience sizes of the various media, brand level advenismg expend11ures. and brand level
case sales are required. A list of the brands used m this study 1s presented m Table 2.

TABLE 2
BRA ND U ED 1:-,.; STl,DY
Ancient Age Bourbon'
Beefeater Gm'
Canadian Club Canadianb
Cuny Sark Scotch'
Early Times Bourbon'
Notes

'Low-Quality Brown
'Low-Quality Whue

Johnnie Walker Red Scotch•
Smirnoff Vodl.;a'
Bacardi Rum'
Calvert Extra Blend'
Christian Brothers Brandy'

Dewar's Scotch•

Gilbey's Gm'

Jim Beam Bourbon'
Kessler Blend'
J&B Scotchb

"H1gh-Qual11y Brown
'H1gh-Qual11y Wh11e

These brands were selected for three reasons. First, they were the best-selhng and the most
advertised liquor brands dunng the sample penod.• Almost all of the brands had sales m excess
of 500,000 cases annually, with a few brands having sales of over 5 million cases annually. For
example, Bacardi sold 7.825 million cases in 1982. and Smirnoff sold 6.3 million cases m 1979.
Adverusmg expendnures by all brands were substanual, but several brands. mcludmg Bacardi and
Smirnoff, spent over $5 million per year for several years of the sample penod.
Second, the set of selected brands consists of a rcpresentauvc cross sccuon of brands in the
liquor industry. Liquors are typically categorized according to 1wo cnteria. The first criteria is
color. liquors are designated as being enher wh11e (the clear liquors) or brown (the dark liquors).
· The second criteria is quality; liquors are designated as bemg high quality or low quality. Thus,
there are four general types of liquor: high-qual11y white, h1gh-qual11y brown. low-quality brown,
and low-quality white. The set of brands chosen for this study contains at least one of each of the
four general groups.
-18-
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Third, the liquor brands chosen used the various media in very different proponions.7
Sunday newspaper supplements were used o nly sparingly by most of the liquor brands. The
brands spent most of their advenising budgets on either magazines or billboards. Some brands
spent an average of 80-90% of their adven ising budgets on billboards; other brands, notably the
pre mium scotches, spent approximately 50% of their budgets o n magazine advenising.
Advertising price data were obtained from Marketing and Media Decisions magazine and
Trends in Media. A measure of media costs that is widely recognized in the advenising industry
is cost per thousand (CPM); this is the cost of presenting one thousand advertising impressions
or messages. C PM is used as a proxy for the advenising med ia prices.
The audience sizes (reaches) of the various media were estimated using Bresnahan ( 1986)
as a guide. For magazines and newspapers, audience size is defined as total c irculation. For
outdoor, reach is defined as total vehicle miles per year.
Advertising expenditures were obtained from Leading Nationa l Advertiser 's Class/Brand
Version Report and Jobson's Liquor Handbook. T hese repons contain brand level advenising
expenditure data broken down by media type. A measure of adven ising exposure or impressions
is estimated from the C PM's for the various media; the dependent variable is the share of a
medium's impressions out of total brand advertising impressions. Finally, brand level sales data
were obtained from Business Week's "Annual Liquor Scoreboard."

RESULTS
With regard to the expected signs of the parameters, theory suggests that the advenising
share should be negatively related to the own-price of advertising and positively related to the
cross-prices of advertising. The advertising share should be positively related to own-reach, but
negatively related to the cross-reaches. Since magazine and Sunday newspaper advertising are
much more expensive than outdoor advertising, the quality variable should be positively related
to magazine and newspaper advertising demand and negativdy related to outdoor advenising
demand. These results would corroborate the advenising signaling hypothesis presented in the
last section. Results for newspaper advertising are presented in Table 3; results for magazine
advertising are presented in Table 4; and results for outdoor advenising are presented in Table 5.
With regard to the economic variables, the newspaper CPM is significant for the newspaper
advertising share equation and the outdoor share equation; these results indicate that the prices of
the various media are not strong determinants of media choice. This result is interesting in that
newspaper advertising is the least utilized of the three media in the liquor industry. The magazine
and outdoor CPM's are not sigmficant at the 5% level in any of the media demand equations.
These results indicate that economic factors have little effect on media utilization. If a highquality brand wants to signal its quality level, the cost of the media 1s not a determining factor.
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TABLE3
EW PAPER DEMA D EQUATIO ' RESULTS
Variable

Coefficient

Constant
ewspaper CPM
Magazine CPM
OutdoorCPM
ewspaper Reach
Magazine Reach
Outdoor Reach
Output
Brown Dummy
High-Quality Dummy
otes.

-122.60
-24.995
-"\5.611
2.6812
"\3.928
-36.997
45.276
-0.6412
-1.1517
1.W70

T-Score
-0. J 3
-2.922
- I 788
0.166
0.747
-2.152
2.090
-0.824
-1.080
1.647

R1 - 511454
Durbin-\\ atson Test Stausuc - 2. I nt-3."\

TABI E 4
;\,I \ GAZI E DEMA;'l.O f,,QlJA flO'\ Rl~Sl,L rs
Variable
Con tant
\"ewspaper CP\,1
Magazine CP"1
Outdo,r CP"1
Newspaper Reach
\1agazine Reach
Outdoor Reach
Output
Brown Dummy
High-Quain; Dummy
Notes

-20-

Coctt,cicnt

T-Score

-1 'i2.
7 9199
8.005 "\
-I"\ 0 9
-3.7594
9 'i629
3.6009
1.1856
-0.9220
1.9400

-0.294
0.874
0.241
-0.914
-0.1 13
0.406
0.167
2.262
-1 180
1657

R1 - 419340
Durbin-\\ at,, ,n Te,t Stau~uc - 2.089232
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TABLES
OUTDOOR DEMA D EQUATIO RESULTS
Variable

Coefficient

Constant
Newspaper CPM
Magazine CPM
OutdoorCPM
Newspaper Reach
Magazine Reach
Outdoor Reach
Output
Brown Dummy
High-Quality Dummy
Notes

24.506
0.8733
-0.3094
0.1534
-1.4972
-0.235 1
-0.8052
-0.0586
0.0356
-0.1290

T-Score
1.032
2.483
-0.548
0.269
-0.995
-0.421
• I .425
-1.592
0.623
-2.814

R' - .679387
Durbin-Watson Test Sta11st1c - 2.174973

The output vanable 1s only significant in the magazine demand equation. The pos1uve sign
on this variable indicates that the greater a brand's output, the more 11 advemses in magazines.
The only reach variables that are significant are the outdoor and magazine reach variables Ill the
newspaper equation; they are significant with a pos111ve and negative sign. respectively. This
result 1s interesting once again because newspaper advemsing is the least utilized media in the
liquor industry TI1c negative sign on the magazine-reach variable indicates that, as the magazine
audience grew, demand for newspaper advemsing fell; this result supports the hypothesis that
magazine and newspaper advertising are substitutes.
The quality dummy vanable 1s significant at the 5% level for both the magazine and outdoor
advertising share equations. 11 is s1gn1ficant at the I0% level for newspaper advemsing. H1ghquali1y brands are thus more likely 10 adverusc in magazines than are low-quality brands, and lowquahty brands arc more likely to advertise on billboards than high-quality brands. One possible
reason for this difference in media u11ilza11on 1~ that high-quality brands may signal their quality
levels to consumers by advc111sing on the most costly medium. magazines.8
The above results indu.:ate that the only cons1s1entl) significant variables in all three media
demand equauons are the qualny dummy variables. Liquor brands, since they are expenence
goods, use advcmsing as a signal of their qual11y, coM cons1dera11ons are not important. This
result suppom 1\/clson\ hypothesis concerning the use of advertising as a signaling device. The
present stud)- expands the \;elson hypothesis by examining the role of media u11liza1ion in
signaling brand quality; when a brand wants 10 cxces 1vel} advemse, 11 will employ the most
expensive medium.

CONCL

IO

1

Results of this srudy indicate that one of the pnmary de1ernunan1s of media choice for liquor
brands 1s the level of quality; liquor brands use the various media in order to signal their qual11y
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levels. This result is an extension of elson ( 1974) in that high-quality brands not only advenise
more frequently than low-<juality brands but also that high-quality brands use different media than
low-<juality brands. Economic variables, however. are not s1gmficant detem1mants of the demand
for media services.
An appropriate extension of this study would be to apply the same empirical technique 10
an industry that employs all media, including television and radio. Such an extension may lend
further support to the media signaling hypothesis presented m this study.
E DNOTES

'This data was obtained from Leading National Ad,ertiser •~ Class/Brand Version Report.
'Fora moo: detailed explanauon of the use of advcrtismg as a signal of quality, see Klein and Leffier
(1981), Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984), and M1lgrom and Roberts ( 1986). The signaling model of Spence
( 1973) has been used 10 explam why high-<juahty products advertise more heavily than low-quality
produclS (Tirole, 1989).
'A high-quality hquor is a liquor that had a price of greater than S 1O per fifth m 1990, this is an
accepted mdustry standard.
'Although hquorbrands do advertise mfrequently m daily newspapers. daily newspaper advenising
expenditure data was not available
'Bresnahan estimated this system of equations usmg 3SLS In this study. hov.ever, each media
equation wasesuma1ed separately, usmg a random effects model. The reason for not using 3SLS is 1ha1,
ifeach equation uses the same explanatOI) vanables. OLS 1s as efficiem as 3SLS (Pmdycl.. and Rubmfeld,
1991 ). Smee each media equauon u11h1,es the same explanatory vanable,. there would be no gam m
efficiency from using 3SLS.
6
Please see Jobson's Liquor Handbook, Business Week\ "Annual Liquor Scoreboard," or
Leading ational Advertiser's Class/Brand Version Report for mformation on liquor brand sales and
advert1smg.

The percentage shares reported here refer to shares of advert1smg 1mpress1ons and not advenismg
dollars. Advertising 1mpress1ons are obtamed by d1v1dmg medium advcrt1smg expenditures by that
medium's CPM, or cost per thousand. The rewll 1s a measure ol medium advert1smg 1mpress1ons.
' In comparison 10 the present study. the results of Bresnahan ( 1986) are not as robust. While the
R~ are approx.imately the same as they are m the present study, only one variable 1s sta11s11cally significant
m each of the brewmg fim1s media demand equations 111 Bresnahan. In add111on, serial correlauon 11
present m two of three media demand equauons.
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